In this paper, Heidegger speaks from the very beginning of the "necessity of resuming the question of being." His approach is, therefore, an ontological one, which follows the ontology of Plato and Aristotle. But at the heart of Heidegger's "fundamental ontology" lies, this time, " Human Dasein . The question of being takes, from the very beginning, the form of the question of the being of a given being.
The authentic existence of man is configured as an opening in the world and as a conscious design that goes beyond the everyday, with the certainty of the inevitable death. Heidegger therefore asks the fundamental question of the meaning of existence, forgotten and trivial, which would not have been sufficiently treated in classical ontology, starting from its origins in Greek philosophy. It is true that Aristotle presents in his "Metaphysics" a systematization of the categories of being, however without thematizing the meaning of existence, which could lead to the understanding of ontological diversity. Man, in his capacity as a being, always has a representation on the idea of existence, an idea that can be assimilated with the knowledge he has about objects. This knowledge is called"ontic" , referring to science, without researching its relations with objects, while the problem of the existence of objects is called "ontological" , insofar as it raises the question of the meaning of existence, it could even be called "pre-ontological". Heidegger's intention is to demonstrate the role of temporal coordinates as a transcendent horizon of the search for meaning. Because people face existence in a non-theoretical form and only temporally conditioned, otherwise one could not say in any form "this is". The explanation of the problem related to time provides the means to examine the meaning of existence, because existence is understood only starting from its temporal form. The interpretation of the being begins with the understanding of temporality. From this results the unitary meaning of the temporal structure in its three dimensions: "Future", "Present" and "Past". This conception of Heidegger marked an important turning point in European philosophy,deconstructivismul.
Important distinctions in Being and time : ontological / ontic, being / being, existential / existential, authenticity / inauthenticity, temporality of Dasein / temporality of being itself.
Being and Time is an unfinished book. The variant published in 1927, with the subtitle Part One , actually contains only the first two sections of the first part. The third section was written by Heidegger, but was not published, as it became clear to the author that it was impossible to continue the philosophical project in this book. The text of the third section was destroyed (according to a testimony by Heidegger). Certain developments that made up the content of the third section are included in the text of the lecture on "Fundamental Problems of Phenomenology", held in Marburg immediately after 1927. To understand the work Being and Timethe lectures given by Heidegger at that time, published posthumously in the Complete Edition / Gesamtausgabe, are indispensable .
In the 1930s, after the author gave up completing the "fundamental ontology" of Being and Time , Heidegger's philosophy would undergo a radical transformation. It will no longer have the human Dasein at its center , but will have the being itself in sight.
Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics (1929)
The most important book, chronologically, after Being and Time , is the so-called "book about Kant", which is based on the extended interpretation of the lecture entitled "Phenomenological Interpretation of the Critique of Pure Reason" (from 1925). From Being and Time , Heidegger had stated of Kant that he was "the first and only one who went a long way in investigating the dimension of the temporality of being" (p. 23). As a result, he interprets it in order to reveal a "metaphysical" Kant, that is, preoccupied with the problem of metaphysics, the ontological one. Heidegger tries to show, through a rather "violent" interpretation (and he will admit this later), that the imaginative faculty ( Einbildungskraft) is "time itself", so that the determination of the human being as Dasein would be prepared there , that is, starting from time. It should be noted that in this book, where the "finitude of man" is predominantly spoken of, his terminological designation is no longer as strict as in Being and Time : Heidegger now speaks of "the Dasein of Man" (which, as Gadamer says, it seemed surprising at the time, because it was no longer possible to know whether Dasein meant man himself or a "faculty" of his own). But this was rather a sign that the philosophical project of Being and Time had begun to undergo changes, which would become more and more radical over time, until Heidegger's philosophy, in the 1930s, experienced a spectacular "upheaval."
The themes approached after 1950 were the history of metaphysics as the destiny of the West, the essence of technique as the realization of metaphysics, with the possibility of overcoming oneself, the essence of language and the function of poetry as a possibility to reach consciousness and escape from superficiality. Other important works by Heidegger from this period were "What It Means to Think" ( 1954 ), "Kant's Theses on Being" ( 1963 ), "On Schelling's Treatise on the Essence of Human Freedom" ( 1971 ).
The most important writing published by Heidegger in his last years is the text of the conference held in Freiburg in 1962, entitled Time and Being (text published in the volume On the Stakes of Thought ). The title is identical to that of the third section of Being and Time and actually wants to signal "that the thinking of Being and Time has been continued." In this text, the key term of the late Heideggerian philosophy, Ereignis , appears for the first time . (This one, like Dasein, is an untranslatable term, but its meaning could be rendered by the formula "the event of one's own revelation"). The text of the conference is accompanied in volume by the minutes of a seminar held on it.
Heidegger did not write political philosophy and rejected the interpretation of his work as a contribution to ethics. [21] Michael Gillespie attempted to reconstruct Heidegger's moral-political philosophy in a compendium of the history of political philosophy, but limited himself to describing it often using the word "seems." Gillespie relied more on Heidegger's silence than on his statements, for example criticizing him for not condemning Nazism. [22] Gillespie's accusations are heavy (leaving the city, associating with monsters, modern Oedipus), but they are intuited rather than proven. What remains certain is that Heidegger took a stand against nihilism, along the lines suggested by Nietzsche . [21]
