The security policy debate in Germany is currently very hot. This gives the impression that there is no alternative to adhering to the transatlantic security architecture and the additional costs required for military means. Keyword: two percent target. Accordingly, Germany is simply not defensible without the United States. Any attempt to achieve autonomy vis-à-vis the Americans on security policy issues is associated with unimaginable costs.

In the face of the collapse of international disarmament and arms control treaties, continued Russian real politics as well as the current transactional understanding of the US of security policy, the general disorientation meets with a new zealous discussion about the role of nuclear weapons, the European security architecture and Germany's relationship to both. It is a pity that the debate is conducted largely without ideas and often with perceived truths, instead of taking the current situation as an opportunity to debate without constraints, but with concrete options.

A very good, because concrete example is the recent excitement about nuclear strategic issues. Shortly after Macron's latest statements on the current state of NATO ("brain dead"), the Körber Foundation published a study with a sensational survey result: 40 percent of Germans would prefer to be protected by a European nuclear deterrent. Only 22 percent want to continue to rely on the US nuclear umbrella in the future.

And who can blame them? The principle of nuclear deterrence is based on the credibility of a nuclear strike in the event of a military attack. It doesn't help much if US President Trump is only hesitant to commit to the assistance clause (Art. 5 of the NATO Statute) and "hard" security issues are not immune to his transactional understanding of politics. With his erratic political style, the American president is shaking the credibility of the US-led nuclear deterrent. “America First” and the protection of allied countries are unfortunately difficult to reconcile. Would a U.S. President Trump Sacrifice Chicago for Hamburg? Hardly likely.

40 percent of Germans would prefer to be protected by a European nuclear deterrent.

This raises the question of whether one should think about a purely European organized nuclear deterrent. Transatlantic policy advisers and experts are quickly trying to nip a new nuclear strategy debate in the bud. In their view, a European organized nuclear deterrent provided by the UK and France would mean high arms spending on conventional armaments. Furthermore, large investments in the nuclear second strike capacity would be required. Given the general skepticism about higher military spending, it is impossible that anyone could want it. Furthermore, disagreement within NATO only serves the interests of Russia.

The problem with this representation is multifaceted. Even if there is a right argument about the operational capability and equipment level of the Bundeswehr and other European armed forces, they are in a position to form a credible deterrent against any conventional aggression. Those who are not sure of this should consult the SIPRI and IISS armed forces overview, which is updated annually .

The assertion of the need for a conventional upgrade in the event of a "screen change" is not plausible. Because it is completely irrelevant which nuclear defense shield a state is under. In order to credibly maintain an expanded French deterrent for Germany and other European countries, no massive nuclear armament is needed. France currently has around 300 nuclear warheads, which could be deployed both at sea and in air. If 300 nuclear warheads are not enough, how many would be enough?

If you take a closer look at these reflexes, you quickly realize that the strategic debate culture of the 1960s is often boiled up again. This is not only scientifically inappropriate. The summoning of strategic maxims from the deepest times of the Cold War deliberately conjures up a certain picture of the current security policy situation in order to rule out options for action.

If you look at the debate, you too often get the impression that the Federal Republic is faced with constraints in terms of security policy and is inevitably drawn into the competition for great powers. In the case of the nuclear strategy, one would consequently have the choice between plague and cholera. Either one would remain under the protection of a US-led nuclear deterrent, but would then have to spend significantly more on defense in order to earn the US protection to a certain extent. Or you can organize nuclear deterrence yourself in a European context, but that would cost a lot more. In this way, a debate is condensed in a flash that only allows two options: upgrade or upgrade a lot more.

For many of the current security threats to which Germany and Europe are exposed, nuclear weapons are just expensive ballast.

The security policy discourse in particular is often caught in an “emergency logic” and creates scenarios that even NATO in its Deterrence and Defense Posture Reviewdescribed as "extremely unlikely". This is why it is particularly important to question certain assumptions and supposed threat scenarios. Generalized demands against the background of diffuse threat scenarios are not only of little benefit, but also politically irresponsible. On the contrary, in times of international upheaval, we should take the opportunity to redefine the value of nuclear weapons for German and European security instead of getting lost in strategic strategic questions about the number and effectiveness of nuclear warheads. For many of the current security threats to which Germany and Europe are exposed, nuclear weapons are just expensive ballast.

Germany's withdrawal from nuclear weapons cooperation with the Americans, on the other hand, would have further advantages. Coordinated with other countries of nuclear participation, such as Belgium or the Netherlands, one could send the important political signal to the Eastern European NATO countries that even a minimal nuclear deterrent under French leadership would serve German and European security interests. In addition, it would enable Germany to act with new credibility on issues of nuclear disarmament. At the moment there is a dilemma to only be able to work internationally for nuclear disarmament with half the force, since nuclear weapons are on their own territory. The withdrawal from nuclear participation could, however, give new impetus to the debate on the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

Certainly we have to discuss (imaginary and concrete) threats, security policy reactions, but above all creative scope. Under no circumstances should we fall back into a “Cold War Retromania” with perceived truths and the postulation of strategic necessities. Domestically, the dominance of the "there is no alternative" approach is beginning to crumble. It is high time that this also happens in security policy.