Europe's chief peacemaker
Emmanuel Macron calls for rapprochement with Russia to strengthen the role of the EU. In the end, however, Vladimir Putin could benefit.
The former German Foreign Minister and today's Federal President Frank-Walter Steinmeier once defined Germany's role in Europe as that of a “chief moderator”. France now seems to have found the new part of the European "chief troublemaker" under Macron. It is obvious that these two approaches do not go very well together. Macron seems to be the proverbial fox in the hen house, especially for the Central and Eastern European countries. The list of recent actions that make him suspect in these countries is long and mostly related to Russia. Aside from his remark that NATO was "brain dead", Macron, without any coordination with Germany, called on Central and Eastern Europeans to come closer to Russia.

First, Macron called for a reassessment of relations with Russia at the ambassadorial conference in August 2019: distance to Moscow was a major strategic mistake, he explained. This was followed by a French roadmap, which focuses on disarmament, security dialogue and crisis management and is to be implemented by the newly appointed special envoy for Russia Pierre Vimont. Ahead of the G7 summit, Macron met with Vladimir Putin and sent his European, Foreign and Defense Ministers to Moscow to continue bilateral dialogue. He also suggested that the Russian proposal for a moratorium on short and medium-range missile deployment, which NATO considered unreliable, be examined.

The French veto to open accession talks with North Macedonia and Albania played into the hands of Russia in the eyes of Central and Eastern European countries.

The final and decisive action was the French veto to open accession talks with North Macedonia and Albania, which in the eyes of Central and Eastern European countries played Russia in the hands. Macron's strategic realignment towards Moscow also fueled fears that France could pressure Ukraine to make concessions at the Paris meeting in Normandy in December 2019 to remove obstacles and achieve an apparently quick fix with Russia. This distrust was fueled by Macron's rhetoric.

Macron claims to be “in no way naive”, but his statements are partly on the same wavelength as Russian commentators, especially when he says that a number of “misunderstandings” in the 1990s and 2000s gave the impression that Europe acts as a "Trojan horse for the West, which is ultimately out to destroy Russia". A Russian analyst even said that Macron's views on European security and world order coincided with those of the Russian president, and concluded that "Macron is our man."

This is, of course, a rough simplification of Macron's position. In fact, Macron emphasizes that Europe cannot afford a conflict-laden relationship with Russia in a changing international environment, because in this way Europe will never gain strategic autonomy and will continue to depend on decisions by the United States and Russia.

Macron wants to offer Russia a strategic alternative to China, because Moscow is "inevitably" faced with the decision whether it wants to remain a "small ally of China".

According to Macron, Europe and Russia would need a “common front” for Europe to be a relevant actor in a future world characterized by bipolar US-Chinese rivalry. Above all, Macron wants to offer Russia a strategic alternative to China, because Moscow is "inevitably" faced with the decision whether it wants to remain a "small ally of China". Macron's logic is reminiscent of traditional Gaullist geopolitics: in a time of strong rivalry between the United States and China, Europe has to stand on its own two feet, and that includes understanding itself with its most powerful neighbor, Russia. According to Macron, this is all the more relevant since Russia is now playing a key role in many regions because of the "weakness" of the West, and a Russian-Chinese alliance would not be in the European interest.

At first glance, this geopolitical logic is convincing: If geopolitical considerations require a rapprochement with Russia because Europe needs Russia as an ally against an increasingly powerful China, why not adopt a milder attitude towards Russia? However, there are two errors in such a way of thinking. First, unconditionally accommodating Europe will not make Moscow choose between Europe and China; rather, Russia will probably play the two against each other. Europeans overestimate themselves if they think they can drive a wedge between Russia and China by offering better relationships or lifting sanctions. Russia traditionally prefers bilateral relations with individual member states to a strong EU. Second, the changes in the international fabric have not led to a change in Russia. From domestic reprisals to violations of international norms to interference: Russian politics is and remains a challenge in itself and cannot be classified as the "lesser evil" compared to China.

Europeans overestimate themselves if they think they can drive a wedge between Russia and China by offering better relationships or lifting sanctions.

Does this mean that Macron's call for rapprochement with Russia and dialogue is wrong and misguided from the start? No. However, it strongly depends on the general conditions. In his speech to the ambassadors, Macron spoke of a "rapprochement accompanied by harsh conditions". Whether Macron's new strategy for Russia will prove successful will depend on how far he is willing to cross the existing red lines: sanctions, the Minsk agreements and Russia's return to the G8. Progress along these guard rails is highly desirable, but as the Normandy Summit has shown, it could be more difficult than Macron imagines.

However, Macron is right when he says that Europe has to think more in geopolitical dimensions. But if the Europeans loosen their preconditions for a strategic dialogue with Russia, this could not result in a European-Russian win-win situation, but rather a double profit for Russia. Europe can only assert itself if it maintains the principles, rules and values ​​on which it is based. If Europe gave up these principles out of supposed geopolitical hardship, it would enter unknown territory. This scenario would have consequences especially for neighboring Eastern European countries. If accommodating Russia means accepting its right to a sphere of influence in Central and Eastern Europe, that would be a dangerous precedent.

Finally, Macon shouldn't repeat past mistakes. There is a lot to learn from Germany's Meseberg initiative in 2010: without prior coordination, Germany concluded an agreement with Russia at the time to set up a political and security policy EU-Russia committee in return for a Russian conflict resolution in Transnistria. The reactions from Brussels and the capitals of the EU member states were mild to say the least. Macron needs to reconcile his ambition and European involvement if he wants to improve security cooperation with Russia. To achieve this goal, however, he needs a united Europe - otherwise he will be considered lightweight, and not only in Moscow.