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The goal of a world free of nuclear weapons is a guideline for German foreign policy. At the beginning of the week, CDU politician Johann Wadephul asked in a Tagesspiegel interview: "If you want to be a good European, you can not only work together in environmental policy, but also in armaments policy." And further: "Germany should be ready to participate in this nuclear deterrent with their own skills and resources. In return, France should put them under joint command from the EU or NATO. ”

The call for nuclear weapons as a response to international crises has set us back decades in the debate. Even if the guidelines of German foreign policy are often vague and fall short of the expectations of various actors, one thing is clear. After all, Germany is trying a new policy approach: multilateralism instead of going it alone, diplomacy instead of Force de Frappe . A Franco-German or European nuclear weapons program would fall behind the Federal Government's policy approach in recent years.

Germany and France are already cooperating closely in the armaments sector, including on the new Future Combat Air System air force project. An even stronger Franco-German or European cooperation with a nuclear component would counteract any alliance of multilateralism . In addition, France last offered Germany limited participation in the French nuclear arsenal under President Sarkozy in 2007. Germany should contribute to the costs of the French nuclear force and have a say in the process. The federal government declined, Germany was a member of the non-proliferation treaty and did not seek to possess nuclear weapons, said Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier at the time. This attitude should still apply today. Participation in the French nuclear program would not be a short affair but a long-term marriage contract. With consequences for the entire arms control and disarmament regime. A "divorce" would only be painfully possible in the future.

Nuclear weapons are weapons of mass destruction. Nuclear deterrence is based on the will and ability to use these weapons. This strategy is neither a basis for a united Europe, whose security perspective varies greatly from the Baltic to Portugal, nor can it be the basis for a cooperative policy towards other countries. How can Germany convincingly argue against the nuclear build-up of others and stand against the nuclear pursuit of North Korea or Iran if it becomes part of a new European nuclear deterrent initiative? Indeed, it would be even more inconsistent than NATO's existing nuclear participation in US nuclear weapons.

Yes, Germany must develop an independent foreign and security policy, which includes more responsibility in some areas. However, participation in nuclear weapons programs cannot be part of it in the long run. It is irrelevant whether the current political style of the US President Trump is fueling the debate or whether it is eventually Marine LePen in France who has nuclear weapons. Decision-makers are changing, but the concept of nuclear deterrence has been shaping international cooperation for 75 years. It has created a system in which certain states may have an instrument to destroy humanity that others will never be entitled to.

It would be naive to assume that this initial situation could lead to stability in the long term. We have already observed the erosion of this approach in recent years. North Korea continues to test nuclear weapons and long-range missiles despite international sanctions. The relationship between Russia and the West is more tense than ever. The conflict with Iran comes to a head again after the respite from the JCPOA created in 2015. Even Turkish President Recep Erdogan called for the right to nuclear weapons in autumn 2019. Nuclear deterrence does not lead to stability. On the contrary, it encourages other actors to strive for the possession of nuclear weapons. Because they see the "nuclear map" as a trump card in the fight for influence and recognition in the international community.

The idea of ​​a new European nuclear deterrent can only be based on the belief in a manageable number of rational actors and the flawless functioning of communication and technology. The accelerated processes of communication and decision making change the political scope, especially in crisis situations. In this context, the risks of nuclear deterrence are mostly underestimated, if not negated, in the public debate. We don't have to worry about all the false alarmsto look at the history, which in particular has brought Russia and the USA to the brink of nuclear war several times. It wasn't until January 2018, when the conflict between North Korea and the USA came to a head, that it wasn't clear in Hawaii for 48 minutes whether a missile was approaching. An information chain was incorrectly triggered by the EMA, which sent an SMS warning to the citizens.

A current Pentagon report points to security vulnerabilities in the software of the new B61-12 atomic bombs, which are open to cyber attacks. Studies on the nexus between new technologies and nuclear weapons show that the development of autonomous weapons, artificial intelligence and offensive cyber capacities increases the risk of using nuclear weapons.

Technical systems and human decisions are fallible. It is therefore the responsibility of political decision-makers to minimize the security risk for the population. That means turning away from nuclear deterrence. As a “good European”, to speak in Johann Wadephul's words, that would actually be a preventive, security policy act. Not only in the national sense, but also in the interest of the community. The use, accidentally or deliberately, of just one nuclear weapon over a single city would have devastating consequences, for which, according to the International Red Cross, no suitable aid measures are availablestood. A potential fallout would not stop at the EU border or in the Kashmir region if the conflict between the nuclear powers Pakistan and India escalated.

It is not only surprising that the discussion on nuclear deterrence is arrested in the Cold War paradigms. The decoupling of the CDU from the attitudes of its voters is also surprising. A Greenpeace survey from the summer of 2019 shows that 89 percent of the CDU supporters polled support Germany's accession to the nuclear weapons ban treaty. You are in favor of banning these weapons of mass destruction. Almost three quarters of the CDU supporters interviewed also explicitly vote for the withdrawal of nuclear weapons from Germany. For the most part, supporters are even higher among supporters of other parties.

The debate on nuclear weapons and deterrence must finally arrive in the 21st century. We encounter the adherence to old paradigms again and again: as a boomerang of new nuclear weapon states.