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Quantum computing may not be as much of an immediate threat to Bitcoin as some have warned, and any real risk might still be years away.
That’s according to a new research note from digital asset investment firm CoinShares, which argues that while Bitcoin’s cryptography is theoretically vulnerable to future quantum advances, current technology falls far short of posing a practical danger.
“Bitcoin’s quantum vulnerability is not an immediate crisis but a foreseeable engineering consideration, with ample time for adaptation,“ researchers at the firm wrote.
Quantum attacks involve powerful quantum computers breaking cryptographic keys that secure Bitcoin or other blockchains, enabling attackers to derive private keys from public information.
Such attacks that are aimed at Bitcoin are not imminent because breaking its core cryptography would require quantum machines far beyond anything that exists today, the researchers argue.
“From a cryptography and engineering standpoint, the quantum threat to Bitcoin remains a medium-to-long-term risk, not an imminent crisis,” Andy Zhou, co-founder and CEO of blockchain security firm BlockSec, told Decrypt. “Even under optimistic assumptions about quantum progress, the industry still has meaningful time to prepare and upgrade.”
The idea behind post-quantum cryptography has been “under rigorous international standardization for years,” Zhou explained, citing how the U.S. National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) had already released its first set of finalized post-quantum cryptography standards in 2024.
The standards include “several quantum-resistant encryption and signature algorithms that are ready for use,” and also have additional algorithms under backup consideration and broader deployment guidance, he explained.
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Zhou pointed to historical instances such as the Y2K problem.
The so-called "millennium bug" was widely feared to trigger systemic failures as the calendar rolled over to January 1, 2000. It “looked like a potential systemic catastrophe, yet it largely failed to materialize,” he said.
“It's not because the risk was imaginary, but because governments and industries spent years auditing and upgrading critical systems in advance,” he said. “The quantum transition for cryptographic systems is likely to follow a similar path: planned migration.”
For quantum threats, estimates cited by CoinShares suggest an attacker would need millions of qubits, which are orders of magnitude more than current systems, to crack a key within hours or days.
Researchers estimate that even the most advanced quantum computers are 10 to 100,000 times too weak to pose a real-world threat, pushing meaningful risk into the 2030s or later.
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Still, legacy addresses could be vulnerable over long timeframes, while attacking active transactions would require near-instant computations that remain far out of reach.
CoinShares said the theoretical quantum risk to Bitcoin stems from algorithms that could eventually expose cryptographic keys or weaken hashing, but stressed that these threats are distant and narrowly scoped.
The firm estimates that about 1.7 million BTC, or roughly 8% of supply, sit in legacy P2PK addresses with exposed public keys, while modern address types hide keys until coins are spent and cannot affect Bitcoin’s supply cap or proof-of-work.
Even in an extreme scenario, CoinShares argued the market impact would be limited, with at most around 10,000 BTC realistically able to be compromised and sold suddenly.
More aggressive fixes could secure the network earlier, but the firm warns they also carry risks, including software bugs, forced assumptions about dormant coins, and erosion of Bitcoin’s neutrality and trust, making gradual, voluntary migration the preferred path.
The takeaway appears to be all about process. CoinShares said in its note that Bitcoin has clear upgrade paths if quantum threats materialize, allowing the network to adapt without disruption, and that the risk should be weighed against fundamentals rather than speculative worst-case scenarios.
